Colombia

"Duque is not in charge in Colombia, Trump is"

In an interview with LPO, Pedro Valenzuela, profesor at Javeriana University and expert in armed conflicts, analyzes the Colombian stage.

Profesor Pedro Valenzuela patiently guides a group of studentsfrom Javeriana University through the streets of the center of Bogotá. Theexcursion begins at the San Francisco church -the oldest church in this capitalcity- and focuses on the political violence that thrashed and continues tothrash Colombia.

A few meters from the church, the group passes by the placewhere, in 1948, the presidential candidate Jorge Gaitán was assassinated. Itwas an act that led to episodes of violent protests, disorder, and suppressionknown as "The Bogotazo."

A few blocks to the north, Valenzuela -a specialist in theColombian armed conflict- shows the colonial house where the "Florero deLlorente" revolt began, an episode which gave rise to Colombian independence.In that house, which maintains its colonial style, the Spanish merchant JoséLlorente refused to lend a flower vase for a Creole regale. They were enraged,and the crisis broke loose.

A few meters away, on the outskirts of the Capital, a plaqueindicates where the senator Rafael Uribe Uribe -en 1914- was assassinated bytwo carpenters attacking him with axes. The figure of that soldier would yearslater inspire Gabriel García Marquez in shaping the character of ColonelAureliano Buendía.

The episodes continue. Before conversing with LPO, Valenzuelaguides the students towards a photography exhibit which shows the violence ofthe war against the guerrillas in the most remote places of the country. Theexcursion concludes in a memorial where the floor is a large surface made ofthe molten metal from the weapons that were handed over by the FARC.

What changes begin toloom since the signing of the Peace Accords between the government and theFARC?

Well, that's one of the big dilemmas. I see the land situation asa big danger for peacebuilding. If you look at the reforms proposed in thePeace Accords, they're not very radical reforms. A process of democratizationin the land exists, but not a direct threat. The possibility of expropriatingthe big landowners is not included; that wouldn't have been possible to agreeupon.

It's about an attempt at an agrarian reform and modernizationthat's quite liberal, but that has to give land access to farmers that don'thave it. But even with those reforms, timid as they are, there is a strongreaction and fear from national and international interests, both legal andillegal.

Colombia is still a country where multiple sovereignties exist which is of course a serious shortcoming of the government's ability to impose its policies.

For example?

What the Colombian government in a schizophrenic state did withthe extractive industries as a big engine for growth clashes with the agreementsmade in the Peace Accords in terms of the farming sectors. On one side there'sthe perspective of the Colombian elite that want to insert the country in theinternational circuit which goes against the democratizing dynamics agreed uponin the accords.

What effect will thishave in practice?

I believe that there are several threats: on one hand thereluctance I just mentioned. On the other hand the farming sectors and thesectors compromised by the implementation of the accords are very stigmatized.But also, there are armed illegal sectors that are turning the sectors mostcompromised by the accords white.

You have to think that Colombia is still a country wheremultiple sovereignties exist which is of course a serious shortcoming of thegovernment's ability to impose its policies.

What impact did theaccords have on the political class? I see that there's a lot of tension anddifferences between Santos, Uribe y Duque because of the accords.

A lot, especially because Uribe's stance is strongly against thePeace Accords, and he is curiously a person that maintains a high level ofacceptance. Because the country is very polarized. It was during the war and itis now in the Post-Accords. So then we have a consolidated political powerwhich is Uribism, which has as one of its political projects preventing a goodpart of the agreements in the Peace Accords from being put in practice.

What role does Duquehave within Uribism?

Some got excited by having Duque as the friendly face ofUribism, but Duque has no political capital. The political capital of the partyis Uribe's, and he is a hardliner. Colombia is a tremendously polarizedcountry. The Accords should have achieved reducing that polarization, butwithout a doubt they ended up expanding it.

Do the reforms proposedby Duque to the transitional justice system presuppose a risk for the PeaceAccords?

I believe they do because the transitional justice system isprecisely one of the big pillars for the Peace Accords, which is a verydifferent justice system from the justice system that they had in Argentinaafter the dictatorship.

The difference is that the transition in Argentina was in thecontext of a discredited military dictatorship that had just lost the FalklandsWar. The dictatorship collapsed, but here the transition with the FARC is witha guerrilla that had the ability to survive and with whom we had to negotiate,and to whom we couldn't demand their surrender, which is what Uribe aimed for.

So then there we began to negotiate some conditions about howthey'd be judged, and the tool is the transitional justice system. What endedup happening is that many people felt resentful because of it. But, curiously,many victims didn't feel that way. They are people that see the Accords as apossibility of ending this war and starting over.

But the Democratic Center wants to take away the ability of thepeople to decide who goes before the transitional justice tribunal. What theywant to do is overload the justice system so that nothing can be done. Who'sgoing to judge some 20,000 combatants from just the FARC? Plus the 2,000 fromthe army that want to take shelter in that justice system? What they want to dois overload the system so that they can't advance. A little like what happenedin Rwanda where they placed 130,000 people in jail without being able to judgethem.

Some got excited by having Duque as the friendly face of Uribism, but Duque has no political capital. The political capital of the party is Uribe's, and he is a hardliner.

And what would be theobjective of braking the peace process?

I get the impression that they are very scared, especially thatthe military go before the transitional justice tribunal. Because if there'ssomeone that knows where the orders were coming from, it's the military. Theyare demanding to be tried under the transitional justice system to havealternative penalties, but alternative penalties imply telling everything. Andthere is a lot of fear in a good part of the Colombian politicians that thetruth be brought to light.

I was surprised by whatyou just said about the victims and their support of the peace process. Doesthe transitional justice system guarantee the rights of the victims of theguerrilla?

Totally. The victims are the axis of the whole transitionprocess. There are many surveys done with victims, and for them the main thingis not whether the guilty go to prison. The main thing is that they can returnto their lives. They want to return to their lands. For many, the condemnationof the FARC is secondary.

How did the integrationprocess of the FARC into democratic life work?

In Congress there aren't too many problems. The rejection ofsome powers in the sessions are noticeable, with insults and those things. Theproblem is with the majority of the FARC, where what was promised wasn'tfulfilled. It's the same problem that the Colombian government has had for along time: they agree, sign, and don't fulfill.

From a politicalperspective, are the FARC already integrated as a new democratic politicalplayer?

Yes, and that's why they move in political contexts that aren'tnecessarily left-wing. The Green Party is not left-wing, and together with theFARC they often maintain a sort of opposition block against the government. Butthe truth is that it did not go well for them politically. In electoral termsit did not go well for them. In the election they garnered about 50,000 votes,and in the small time I was able to talk with them, they told me that they werehoping for about 200,000 votes.

In some ways they are paying their dues for being novices in thedemocratic political arena, which calls for different qualities than being asuccessful military like they were. That is a price that several demobilizedgroups from the guerrilla had to pay. They understand that their project can'tbe radical. It has to be a more open project.

FARC are paying their dues for being novices in the democratic political arena, which calls for different qualities than being a successful military like they were. That is a price that several demobilized groups from the guerrilla had to pay. 

A conflict exists aboutthe Victim and Land Restitution Law approved during Santos' tenure. Duque wantsto modify it, and there is resistance to the changes. How severe can this befor the peace process?

It's a very fragile situation. What was agreed upon is veryimportant, but the ability to implement it is very questionable. And soeverything is fragile, and it's combined with exclusion that's being produced,but also with the fact that there are a lot of armed people. That could resultin an increase in armed people, which would be unnerving.

Even more so if Duque starts to get himself into regionaladventures. Because we already know who's in charge: Trump is in charge, notDuque. And the scolding that they just gave Duque from Washington isn't free.

The government is trying to give off an image of being a superally of the United States without understanding that one can't be their allyregarding these issues. On the contrary, one is in submission to the UnitedStates.

You talk about thecriticisms from Trump to Duque, and there enters the debate about thefumigation of illicit crops with glyphosate. Is it true that since thefumigation stopped, the area of illegal crops grew?

Yes. That is an objective fact, but the solution isn't tofumigate again. You have to comply with what was agreed upon with thecommunities, which is the substitution of crops with the heavy presence and bighelp from the government to help look for an alternative.

Fumigation can allow for greater control of the cultivatedareas, but you'd be generating another very serious problem, which would be thecontinuing deforestation of the country because the crops relocate, deforestingjungles and forests. And if they eliminate all of the Colombian crops, thesecan just relocate to Ecuador or Venezuela. So that isn't the solution.

Even worse is that it's easier to act with war logic and installthe idea of fumigations again without caring if the U.N. says that there arecarcinogenic elements, or that they just punished Bayer because of that.

Do you agree with thePeace Accords? Do you think that more could have been done? Do you think thatwhat could be done was done?

I agree with what they accorded. I believe that they containimportant reforms, and they are reforms that will contribute to peacebuildingin the country. As far as the FARC, perhaps more should've been done, but giventhe practical issues and the correlation of powers, I don't think more could'vebeen done. It's not a small thing what was accomplished, and I believe that theAccords are enough to begin building a lasting peace.

I know it's anambitious and very broad question, but how can the complexity be summarized soas to find a solution to the armed conflict in Colombia?

With regards to the causes, I think that one of the axes is theissue of the land and access to it. In Colombia the continuing confrontationshad to do with the possession of the land. In fact, one of the main points ofthe FARC's agenda is an integral rural reform.

Another axis has to do with the political participation. Asystem that, even though it kept some of the characteristics of a liberaldemocracy, was ultimately very excluding and where there prevailed a politicalculture very intolerant of criticism and dissension. Colombia has a closedsystem. In terms of bipartisan subsistence, it's one of the longest in LatinAmerica.

So that bipartisanshipdidn't leave space for the expression of other sectors?

When the country was rural, perhaps those two powers captured agood part of the political tendencies. But when it stopped being rural andbecame 75% urban, growing powers arose in the cities, mostly from the left,with different nuances. And there they didn't find a niche where they couldparticipate within the political institution.

You can see there still exists a large reluctance to permit thatparticipation. It's worth it to remember the effort the FARC made in the 80'sto create a political party through an institutional movement. It was called"the genocide of the Patriotic Union." We hope that won't happen again becauseit would mean condemning the country to another wave of violence.

In Rwanda they killed 800,000 people in two and a half months, and that to reach that figure in Colombia, we'd have to extend the violence for 150 or 200 years. It's not to minimize the tragedy of the victims in Colombia, but to put things in perspective.

There exists a tendencyin Latin America to assert that the armed conflict in Colombia is impossible toresolve, and I understand that you refute that phrase.

When I returned to Colombia after being abroad for a long time,I found a view that was too self-absorbed. They asserted that this was theworst conflict in the world; the bloodiest and thus the most difficult toresolve.

I pointed out, then, that in Rwanda they killed 800,000 peoplein two and a half months, and that to reach that figure in Colombia, we'd haveto extend the violence for 150 or 200 years.

It's not to minimize the tragedy of the victims in Colombia, butto put things in perspective. It's not the most difficult conflict to resolve.We just showed that by reaching an agreement with the FARC after a conflict of50 years, and it certainly isn't the bloodiest.

We also need to recognize that the conflict in Colombia has avery complex dynamic and a financial source that makes it so that this couldlast as long as drug trafficking exists.

Would that be a thirdcause to the conflict?

I would say that it's what allows the war to continue. I don'tknow if it's a cause. But it is a financial source for all the sectors, and forsome of the players it's the main cause.